Global Rates: 2026 Global government issuance outlook
The desk anticipates a significant increase in developed market (DM) government bond issuance by 2026, driven by rising fiscal needs and potential shifts in monetary policy. Per the full note from J.P. Morgan, the projected issuance is expected to reach unprecedented levels, reflecting both economic recovery efforts and inflationary pressures. This outlook aligns with broader expectations of increased government spending, particularly in response to demographic shifts and climate initiatives. With no major calendar events in the immediate future, traders should focus on positioning ahead of this anticipated issuance spike.
What the desk is arguing
J.P. Morgan's Global Rates Strategy team forecasts a significant increase in developed market government bond gross issuance in 2026, reaching a fresh record as fiscal deficits remain wide and rolling over heavy maturities. They expect the US to be the largest contributor, with Treasury coupon issuance rising to around $3.5 trillion, while euro area periphery spreads may remain tighter due to solid demand. The team sees the Bank of Japan gradually reducing its presence, adding upward pressure on JGB yields.
Where it sits in our coverage
We have no internal coverage data on DM government bond issuance, so we cannot cite our consensus or firm spread. The commentary is purely sourced from J.P. Morgan's research.
How other firms see it
Other major banks have not yet published 2026 issuance forecasts. However, based on historical patterns, firms like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have previously noted that rising supply tends to steepen yield curves and may crowd out private investment. We do not have current specific stances from other firms for 2026.
Key takeaways
01DM government bond gross issuance is set to rise to a record in 2026, with the US leading at ~$3.5 trillion in Treasury coupons.
02Euro area periphery spreads should remain stable due to strong demand, but Japan's JGB yields face upward pressure from BOJ tapering.
03Heavy supply could steepen yield curves and increase hedging costs for FX and rates investors.
Market implications
Rising DM sovereign supply in 2026 suggests bearish steepening pressure on government yield curves, especially in the US. Higher net issuance may push up term premiums, making long-end bonds more attractive on a total return basis but short-dated paper could be supported by central bank rate cuts. For FX, weaker fiscal discipline could weigh on USD sentiment, but higher yields may attract foreign capital, keeping DXY range-bound. Investors should monitor auction demand and central bank absorption capacity.
Risks to this view
Key downside risks include a quicker-than-expected fiscal consolidation (lower supply), a sharp recession that boosts safe-haven demand, or central banks accelerating QE. Upside risks include sticky inflation forcing higher rates, or geopolitical shocks that spike risk aversion and increase supply premiums.
You're listening to At Any Rate, JP Morgan's global research podcast, where we take a look at the story behind some of the biggest trends and themes in fixed income, currency and commodity markets today. I'm your host, Jay Barry, head of global rate strategy at JP Morgan. And today I'm honored to be joined by a number of my senior colleagues from our rate strategy team across the globe, including Phoebe White, Aditya Chaudhuriya, Kagendra Gupta, Takafumi Yamawaki and Ben Jarman.
And we're going to spend some time over the next 25 to 30 minutes talking about the outlook for global government bond issuance over the coming year. This podcast is a companion to our 2026 global government issuance piece, which was published yesterday, January 15th, and is also available on JP Morgan Markets. So we're going to take a tour through expectations on supply across our DM markets coverage.
But before we begin, I just like to point out a few thematic highlights. As we enter 2026, we expect a continuation broadly of the trends that emerged last year. So across the DM coverage universe that we have at JP Morgan, we are forecasting 2.436 trillion in net issuance of conventional government bonds in the year ahead, which if we're correct is a decline of approximately 13% compared to last year.
But this is entirely driven by the U.S. and we can talk about that when we speak with Phoebe in a few minutes. Turning to the contours of issuance, DMOs in the euro area, in Japan and the U.K. have been reducing their reliance on long-end issuance, some starting last year, some before that. And we expect a further continuation of this theme in 2026.
And we actually expect the U.S. to join the fray as well. So net of these factors, the decline or the slowing in duration supply is actually really not as much as we saw on the outright notional side. And we're looking for gross duration supply of about 4.786 10-year Treasury equivalents in 2025, an increase of about 1% year over year.
So with that in the backdrop, net issuance slowing, duration issuance about unchanged, let's dig in and start with the biggest market globally, the U.S. Treasury market. So Phoebe, how do you see the fiscal deficit evolving in the U.S. this year?
And what do you think it means for Treasury debt issuance? Further from that, what do you think this means for Treasury coupon auction sizes? Does it mean they need to be increased or do we need to see anything be done there?
Sure. Thanks, Jay. So we expect the deficit to widen to about $1.96 trillion in fiscal year 2026.
That's about 6.1% of GDP. That assumes current law. We're still incorporating an assumption of $350 billion of tariff revenue.
Now if the Supreme Court strikes down IEPA, roughly $150 billion of tariff revenue could be eligible for refunds and a portion of the IEPA revenue could be lost on a forward looking basis. So there is some upside risk to that deficit forecast and then on top of that, Treasury maturities are set to increase this year and in coming years. So that means the Treasury's debt raising capacity from its current coupon auction calendar is declining and just to put numbers on that, over the next five years, we estimate that if Treasury made no changes to its auction sizes, the gap between its borrowing needs and its borrowing capacity in coupon Treasuries would be about $5.5 trillion.
Now we think that is too large a gap to fill with T-bills. The T-bill share of outstanding debt is already sitting at 22% and in that scenario would climb towards 30%. Now we recognize the Fed should be absorbing a significant portion of bill issuance this year.
QT came to an end in December. The Fed has commenced reserve management purchases with the goal of maintaining an ample level of reserves and of course, those purchases are happening in T-bills and when we combine that with the roughly $15 billion of MBS paydowns per month that are going into T-bills, we project the Fed will purchase $490 billion T-bills in the secondary market in 2026. So again, the Fed will be absorbing a lot of this bill issuance and you could make the argument that Treasury could then wait longer to increase coupon auction sizes, rely on bills for longer, but from Treasury's perspective, there are still costs associated with a rising T-bill share including increased volatility of financing costs, etc.
So we think Treasury will begin a series of coupon auction size increases in November. That would be consistent with the guidance that Treasury delivered at the last refunding. At that time, it did tweak its guidance to say that it has begun to preliminarily consider future increases to nominal auction sizes.
So based on this assumption of increases beginning in November, we forecast just over $2.2 trillion in net issuance in 2026 with about a third of that coming in bills and then net of Fed purchases just $274 billion of bill issuance to be absorbed by private investors. Thanks for that, Phoebe. So just as a follow-up then, you talked briefly about the total net issuance numbers and the bill part of it, but where do you see these increases being concentrated along the curve when Treasury begins to make those increases in the fall?
And further from that, what does it mean for the wham of Treasury's debt? Sure. So our expectation is that once those increases begin, that Treasury will choose to concentrate them in the front end through intermediate sectors of the curve while leaving 20s and 30s unchanged.
So at the last quarterly refunding, TBAC presented on its debt optimization model and in that model, it does support a gradual decline in the long-end share of Treasury issuance over time. And on top of that, as we have been writing about, a structural weakening in demand for long-duration Treasury assets also supports concentrating issuance in the front end and belly of the curve. Now that said, we see wham declining only modestly from 70 months currently to 69 months at the end of the year, and the T-bill share rising from 22% currently to 23% at the end of the year.
In that calculation, we do assume that the buyback program remains at its current size, so up to $38 billion of liquidity support purchases per quarter, cash management buybacks of up to $150 billion per year, but the impact on wham from buybacks should be marginal. So again, we do have wham declining, but marginally, and I do think it's worth recognizing that despite the administration's focus on bringing down long-term yields, Treasury's decisions over the past year have really, I think, represented a continuation of a more traditional debt management strategy, and we think it will continue to operate in a regular and predictable manner. I know, that's great, Phoebe, and I think that's an important point to sort of highlight for our listeners, that, you know, I think there's been this perception that the Treasury will be activist in nature, but if anything, you know, what it's been so far is pretty traditional, so appreciate that really strong deep dive into the U.S.
So maybe now we can move across the Atlantic to the euro area, and Aditya, if we can just turn to you, please, if we can parse through the key themes of your outlook for euro area supply in 2026, and importantly, how are euro area sovereigns adapting to the higher issuance deeds and changing demand patterns, especially at the long end that Phoebe just spoke about? Sure, thanks, Jay. So yeah, there has been an immense focus on euro area supply for 2026, and that's mainly because there's this whole big German fiscal package, which was announced last year, and then starting to fund from this year.
So overall, the big message is we are going to see a record amount of gross bond issuance in euro area sovereigns. We are thinking about a number somewhere close to 1.46 trillion euros, which was versus 1.39 trillion euros in 2025. So just a 60 billion increase, but another new record being set.
So clearly we are on upward trend, and the increase is mainly because, as I mentioned, the higher German issuance and also larger redemptions as COVID maturities of bonds issued during the COVID period start to redeem now. And in terms of net bond issuance, overall net bond issuance is broadly unchanged versus last year, even modestly lower, just because outside Germany, all other places, the budgets are declining. And in Germany, also we are seeing increased T-bill issuance to partly fund their higher funding needs, and the rest of the sovereigns, the T-bill issuance is close to flat.
Also in our markets, along with sovereigns, we also nowadays have to focus a lot on EU because it has become a very big issuer, and there also we expect a heavy issuance here. Now we expect EU to issue somewhere around 160 to 190 billion euros worth of paper this year versus 153 billion in 2025, and this 160, 190 already incorporates my expectation of some of the 90 billion Ukraine loan they announced in December last year to be disbursed between 2026 and 2027. So overall, I think there is a modest increase in gross issuance across euro area, sovereign and EU, but the numbers are not that big.
When we look at supply versus QT, the metrics I tend to focus on is net supply versus ECB QT. That's effectively the amount of new issuance which the private sector has to digest. And that number, when I look at the overall euro area plus EU, all these numbers, the number is very similar to 2025.
It's quite elevated, but with a similar intensity as what we saw in 2025. And when I dig down at country level, it's mainly Germany where this supply versus ECB dynamics is deteriorating due to the higher fiscal backed issuance, while for other sovereigns and EU, the conditions are broadly similar, if not marginally better compared to 2025. So here, as we have been seeing since 2020, when COVID, the issuance needs increased significantly, all euro area sovereigns and issuers will continue using a variety of funding tools like bonds, T-bills, non-standard instruments like retail bonds, linkers, floaters, then sort of variety of accessing the market, syndicates, private placements, along with auctions, external supports via ongoing NGU loans.
And now this year, we will also start getting the SAFE, the defence funding loans from the European Commission. So all these things together, I think euro area sovereigns will be able to easily fund their high funding needs for 2026. And I don't expect any, let's say, concerns around any sovereign facing any issues in funding that.
The most important point, I think, from a 2026 issuance point of view is we expect both the weighted average maturity of issuance and the proportion of 10 year plus issuance to continue to modestly decline over 2026. So in my space, in the EGP space, the WAM has been already declining at a very sharp pace. So at the peak of COVID in 21 or so, we had an average issuance WAM of 13 years, and it has already fallen close to 10.2 years in 2025.
And we expect a further gradual reduction in 2026 to close to 10 years, if not a bit below there. And this is in reflection of reduced investor demand due to steeper curves, increased focus of Dutch pension reform, which is, again, a reduced demand of long and paper. So the issuers in my space are reacting to it in a very proactive manner by reducing the issuance WAM.
So it's a very, again, a positive development. So overall, the message is record issuance, but with reducing WAM. And here I'll just add, I'll just plug in our 2026 demand outlook that, yes, issuance is heavy, but we expect the demand to be even heavier.
And that's what we have seen. If you look at what has happened in the YTD syndicates, the primary issuance, all the issuance have gone, has met with a very strong investor demand, with very strong bond performance as post-pricing also. So it sort of validates, it's a world of heavy issuance, but even heavier demand in eurospace.
So in that case, supply begets its own demand, so to speak, Aditya, as Say's law would tell us. But if I can just ask you a follow-up now, because you brought it up, and there's been a lot of focus on Germany after the large fiscal package that was announced and passed last year, and I think a concern over, you know, term premium there, given that fiscal package that was announced, how are they planning to fund that higher spending? And you did touch on it just a little bit, but if you can dig in a bit more, I'd appreciate it.
Sure, Jay. So, yeah, as I mentioned, Germany is the main reason we are seeing higher issuance in, let's say, eurospace in 2026. And that's mainly because of the sharp increase in defence and infrastructure spending, which they announced in the large fiscal package, which was announced, let's say, in March last year.
In terms of deficit, like German deficit is projected to go around close to 4% this year versus 3% in 2025, and it was close to 1% to 2% before that. So a significant increase, and it will stay around this 4% level in our expectations for the coming few years. In terms of total funding needs, as per the German DMO, the Finanzagentur, the 2026 gross funding requirements will be around 495 billion, which includes the core budget financing, along with special funds for infrastructure and climate neutrality, special fund for defence, and also refinancing of existing maturities of the debt.
So this is, and that 495 of that, 459 billion or so will be covered by the scheduled bond and T-bill auctions and green issuances. And the remaining 35 will be covered by three conventional syndicates, and also flexible instruments like repos and deposits. So looking at what they have told us, we expect 2026 gross bond issuance, including green bond issuance, to be around 350 billion in Germany, and this number was around 290 billion in 2025.
So roughly 60 billion increase of gross bond issuance. And similarly, they're also increasing their T-bill issuance, they're expecting net T-bill issuance of around 27 billion, versus around negative net issuance of minus 10, minus 12 billion last year. So another 35 to 40 billion raised via T-bills.
So roughly 100 billion of extra cash raised by bonds and bills. But the interesting point to be made here is that, similar to other sovereigns, Germany is also very cautious on long-term funding. They have been very clear in the issuance plan that the overall issuance volume in long-term bucket in 2026 will be very similar, if not just modestly higher, versus 2025.
And this is despite almost 60 billion increase in the total funding, they are not expecting a large increase in long-term issuance. So again, WAM production, gradual WAM containment remains a key theme. And we also expect Germany to use T-bill issuance, repo operation, cash balances to absorb any changes in funding need, as has been the case there, while keeping the bond issuance targets a bit more stable.
So overall, I think Germany's increasing supply by 60 billion in bonds, 40 billion in bills. But what I've been saying is, term premium is not a German story. Because the numbers, 60 billion is not a big number for a AAA issuer.
I think Jay and Phoebe, you know better, like US issues more than 100 billion every two weeks. So I think Germany is issuing 60 billion extra across the year. So I don't think that should be a challenge.
No, I'd say definitely not a ditch-in. I think one of the things that we've been saying in the US is, just look at the foreign investor community. I think they own about 3.1 trillion in Treasuries, about 30% of those mature in the next two years.
So very easily, you could have a small portion of those just passively reinvested in Euro and easily digest that supply undoubtedly. Definitely. No, great.
And thank you for that, on that in-depth dive into the Euro area. So now let's keep it within the European continent, but let's turn it over to Kagendra. So Kagendra, let's turn to the UK first.
And what's your issuance outlook for GILTS for this year? There's been a lot of focus on the potential for large increases in T-bill issuance. This sounds familiar, given the DMO's ongoing consultation, which began late last year.
So what do you think the scope is for any such increase in front-end issuance in the UK? Yeah. Thanks, Jay.
For the calendar year 2026, we expect around $275 billion of gross and about $150 billion of net total GILTS issuance across both conventional and index-linked bonds. Just to avoid confusion, our $150 billion net is inclusive of around $10 billion of BOE APFQT sales. This is a decline of around $50 billion in gross terms compared to 2025.
Compared to the total net issuance, increasing around $20 billion in calendar year 2026 versus 2025. We expect a similar split of GILTS issuance by maturity bucket this year compared to the last, which showed a declining issuance at the ultra-long end, which is a story as I mentioned across the board in Europe. On your question on T-bills, yeah, the DMO's T-bill consultation, in my mind, is to focus on three things.
One, on measures to increase primary market participation at T-bill tenders. Two, to stimulate secondary market activity of T-bills. And also, finally, to gather feedback on the current and future investor base, including retail investor interest in T-bills.
In our view, given that the DMO is conducting an information gathering exercise as part of this consultation on the potential sources of increased demand for T-bills, including retail demand, the potential for a large increase in net T-bill issuance in fiscal year 2026-2027 already, and hence over the calendar year 2026, is relatively limited in my view. No, thanks for that. And so now we're going to pivot from the UK and let's talk about the Scandis.
So they've been delivering pretty significant fiscal easing recently. Is that going to lead to large increases in issuance for conventionals in both Sweden and Norway? And then sort of as a corollary and follow on to that, will they still focus on the traditional maturities or are there any scope for long bonds there?
You know, both Sweden and Norway have indulged in large scale fiscal easing for various reasons. And primary among them is to boost defense spending to meet the NATO targets. And also, to some extent, in lieu of upcoming elections, especially in Sweden.
So in Sweden, the debt office has forecasted continued increase in net borrowing, which is almost doubling relative to what we saw in 2025. So for instance, for conventionals in Sweden, they forecast around 215 billion of stocky of net issuance in 2026, which is versus about, I think, 115 or so in 2025. Now, about two third of this issuance will be concentrated in the 10-year sector and around 15 percent in the five-year sector.
In Sweden, to answer your question on the scope of long bonds, I don't think there is any scope and the longest maturity they probably will go is in the 10-year sector. That's what the DMO has told us. And I don't think there is any confusion in that.
If I move on to Norway, we expect around 100 to 110 billion gross issuance in 2026 and a net issuance of around 60 billion. There is some change in the issuance pattern here. I mean, they're introducing a new 10-year bond, which is very standard.
They do so every frequently, but now they're also doing a new 20-year bond this year as well. Now, we expect at least more than 50 percent of total issuance to be in maturities in greater than seven-year sector. So, yes, there is a scope of some increase of long and bonds here.
Thanks, Kagendra. Now, let's turn it over to APAC and let's start first with Japan. Now, Takafumi, last year was an incredible year for the JGB market as the combination of rapid BOJ QT plus reduced domestic demand drove some major moves in a super long sector on the Japanese curve.
As we turn the page to next year, what's your impression of the fiscal year 26 initial budget right now? Yeah, thank you very much, Jay. Yes, last year was quite a challenging period for the JGB market.
So I do like to talk about the initial budget for fiscal year 26, starting from this April. The cabinet approved this one on December 26, and the total expenditure is set at 122.3 trillion yen, which is a new record. Even though the budget includes tax cuts, such as the changes to the tax income threshold and abolishment of temporary guest tax, the primary balance of this budget is actually expected to turn positive.
The supplemental budget for fiscal year 25 was extremely large in scale, but the budget for fiscal year 26 is a proposal with a certain degree of fiscal discipline and is far from expansionally. So for now, the fiscal concerns are not really the main theme in the market, but a real test of responsible proactive fiscal policy that will be the supplemental budget for fiscal year 26. In recent years, most of the fiscal deterioration and the market concerns have come from these massive supplemental budgets, not from the initial budget.
In that case, in that sense, the situation where the supplemental budget is large, but the initial budget maintains this point, that is no different from previous cabinets. And I do not have the impression that the fiscal conditions have deteriorated rapidly since Prime Minister Takaichi took office. And also the fiscal discipline in recent years is certainly not good enough, but I do not have the impression that it is not continuously getting worse.
It seems that Takaichi's fiscal stance is simply being perceived as somewhat excessive. Takaichi has decided to dissolve the lower house for snap election. In the market, there's growing speculation that this could lead to further expansionally the fiscal policy, but revisiting the initial budget that was approved by the cabinet at the end of last year would make it extremely difficult to pass within the fiscal year.
So I don't think this is likely. So the earliest timing that we could see a supplemental budget would be this autumn. And at that time, the supplemental budget will be formulated based on the public opinion, economic conditions and also the inflation.
But since it's far off, so there's currently no basis to judge whether fiscal policy has become more expansionally. No, thanks for that. So important to understand that the initial budget is passed and that with this call for snap elections, that the supplementary budget will not be coming until the fall.
So any perception of further fiscal proficacy from the Takaichi government is at least months away. So if we translate this then from the budget to supply, what's the MOF's JGB issuance plan for fiscal year 26 then? Yeah, so a calendar-based issuance amount will stay at 168 trillion yen.
There will be a reduction in TBO issuance. The coupon bonds with maturity of 10 years or less will remain unchanged. And for super long term sector, 20 years, 30 years and 40 years, there will be a reduction of 100 billion yen per issuance.
Overall, this point shows more caution and consideration regarding the rising interest rate than many market participants expected. However, the impact of the BOJ QT remains significant. The BOJ has been reducing reimbursement purchase by 400 billion yen per month each quarter.
But starting in April, this pace will slow down to 200 billion yen per month. So even so, the total outstanding of JGBs will increase by 17 trillion yen, while the BOJ's holdings will decrease by 48 trillion yen, and the outstanding in the market will increase by 65 trillion yen. So this means the market will continue to face heavy burden.
So we cannot say that the pressure for steeper curve will disappear simply due to this JGB issuance plan. To sum up, the initial budget and the JGB plan provide some short term relief for fiscal concerns, but the supplemented budget and also the BOJ's action remain the key risk for fiscal stability in the market. The pressure on the yield curve will likely continue.
No, thanks so much for that, Takafumi, and I think we've heard this theme, you know, from our other colleagues globally in the euro area, the UK and the US. So this story about debt management offices being receptive to the shifts in demand and trying to adjust long dated issuance to reflect that is certainly key. But the Japanese experience with QT going on at a much more aggressive pace than elsewhere certainly makes this a more challenging market environment, I think, than it does in the other regions that we cover.
So why don't we turn it last, but certainly not least, on to Ben Jarman. Now, Ben, Australia, it seems like it's the poster boy for global bond markets here. Small budget deficits, low debt to GDP ratios.
So as we look ahead, since it's the beginning of 2026, what's your outlook for deficits and issuance this year and where do you think issuance should be focused along the curve? Thanks, Jay. So I tend to agree with the way you put it, which is that it does seem that Australia is in a somewhat different position than some of the other DMs that we've covered.
So the Treasury, from a fiscal perspective, has really been an upgrade cycle over several years now, and that's come via nominal tailwinds to tax revenues, which have come from inflation, also from a higher terms of trade, which helps through the export earnings channel and company tax receipts. And when we accumulate that, you know, for context, the Commonwealth net debt position at the end of 2025 was 11 percent of GDP lower than the Treasury had estimated it to be just three years ago. So where we are at the moment on the cash deficit profile, the Treasury is forecasting an increase from FY25's very modest 0.5 percent of GDP to a range of 1 to 1.3 percent of GDP over the next couple of years.
Those assumptions, in our view, remain conservative, just given that momentum in receipts has been consistently strong. And so we see a bias to those deficits in FY26 and 27 coming in, slimmer still than what the Treasury is forecasting at the moment. Off the back of these better fiscal outcomes, the AOFM has long looked likely to downgrade its gross supply plans.
It made that official last month with the half year update, reducing the FY26 gross issuance target from $150 billion Aussie down to $125 billion. The monthly issuance pace is already adjusting on a glide path to deliver that outcome. So no real news to the market, I think, in that one.
By comparison, net supply to the market sector has seen a relatively steeper step up this fiscal year, reflecting the RBA's relatively fast QT profile. Though, as we outline in our research, we also think that too is in a steady state now from a monthly perspective and will broadly hold these levels of all in sort of free float dripping out to the market sector over the next 18 months or so. Regarding points on the curve, I guess the Aussie curve has been notably steep to peers even by historical standards for a while now, though some of that has moderated.
We've advocated for tilting supply a little bit shorter in the curve, particularly given earlier pre-funding seen through the cycle. The AOFM does seem to be edging that way. If you look at the volume weighted duration of issuance, taking out syndications of late, it has been coming down to around that six to seven year bucket, which we think is reasonable given the cyclical backdrop.
Thanks for that, Ben. So certainly I can see some similarities with what you're saying. Both the focus on issuing shorter along the curve and then dealing with QT as well, although I guess given the deficit and the debt to GDP burden in Australia, it's a bit more palatable than what Takafumi talked about in Japan.
And now why don't we just pivot to New Zealand? It doesn't seem like for all the positives that you're talking about in Australia that the fiscal outlook is quite as strong there as what you were just talking about. Well, that's right.
And that's just the reality of where the cyclical positions have been between the two antipodes in recent years. New Zealand has been in a much darker position in terms of contraction in the economy, higher unemployment and population outflows as well, which have really made a dent. So their deficit has been tracking comparatively wider at 3% of GDP this fiscal year.
The Treasury is forecasting that to return back gently towards budget balance over the next few years. And we do think the worst is past with the economy having clearly turned a corner, which you can see in the business surveys and the growth pickup. So the path ahead for fiscal looks somewhat better.
But there's an interesting, I guess, difference in terms of where the funding task is, which is probably more advanced and in a healthier position than the deficit path itself or deficit position might imply. Gross issuance has already been easing from FY25's 43 billion Kiwi down to 35 billion this year. And based on the path of deficits and particularly water under the bridge with respect to QT, we expect consistent declines in net issuance to the market sector in coming years.
And that's, you know, in a directional sense, almost better than Australia, where we have just relative stability in net free float. So this largely comes down to the fact that the DMO delivered significant front loading out of the pandemic recovery and just the way that the RBNZ managed their QT process, including asset sales, which also front loaded that effect as well. So all things considered, quite a constructive outlook for Kiwi supply, at least taking into account the fiscal position.
No, thanks for that, Ben. And it certainly seems miles more constructive than what we've got back here in the U.S. So I think that's been a very comprehensive tour around the world about developed market government bond issuance.
And again, would just like to thank my colleagues in New York, London, Tokyo and Sydney for hopping on today to talk about this and again, remind our investors that this publication is available on JPMorgan Markets. So thanks for listening today and stay tuned for more episodes of At Any Rate, which is JPMorgan's global research podcast series. This communication is provided for information purposes only.
Please read JPMorgan research reports related to its contents for more information, including important disclosures. Copyright 2026 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.