To what extent is the rise in long-dated rates attributable to AI?
Lead — The rise in long-dated rates, which is partially driven by AI-related spending and productivity, underlines the complex interlinkages between technology and finance. Per the full note from ING, approximately 20% of the recent upward pressure on long-dated rates can be attributed to AI dynamics, with the spending aspect accounting for one-third of current economic growth. As long-end rates are responding to heightened capital markets issuance by technology firms, this environment reflects a blend of productivity gains and persistent inflationary pressures, particularly ahead of central bank rate decisions. The market consensus for EUR/USD reflects a median target of 1.1700 for March 2026, with rates expected to remain range-bound amidst these influences.
What the desk is arguing
The observation that long-dated rates are influenced significantly by AI dynamics is a critical focus for FX traders. Per the full note from ING, 20% of the total impact on long-dated rates comes from AI, with approximately 70% linked to productivity and 25% related to actual AI issuance. The spending and capital markets outputs of evolving technologies are malleable factors that need to be considered in rate forecasts and broader FX strategies.
The note draws on the anticipated structural shift in capital markets as technology firms ramp up their capital spending. As annual investment approaches $1 trillion, especially in the Tech, Media, and Telecommunications (TMT) sector, continued high levels of issuance can be expected, suggesting sustained upward pressure on long-dated rates that traders should monitor closely.
Where it sits in our coverage
For the EUR/USD pair, our current consensus target is 1.1700, with a range of 1.1200 to 1.2000 for March 2026. Specific firm targets include: - socgen: 1.1700 - rbc: 1.1600 - barclays: 1.1700
This view aligns closely with the cross-firm consensus, particularly with EUR/USD targets concentrated similarly within the community.
How other firms see it
Many firms appear to be aligned with a moderate bullish stance on EUR/USD, reinforcing expectations that long-dated rates will remain influential in determining currency trajectories. nomura and investec share similar sentiment with their respective targets leaning towards 1.1700, supporting the overall narrative outlined by ING.
In tune with ongoing discussions around AI and central bank policies, the EUR/USD trajectory is likely influenced by broader monetary policy signals from both the ECB and the Fed, particularly as debates around inflation persist.
01Long-dated rates are affected by AI, contributing approximately 20% to the rise.
02AI spending and productivity are forecasted to drive significant corporate issuance in the TMT sector.
03Current consensus target for EUR/USD is 1.1700 for March 2026, within a range of 1.1200 to 1.2000.
04Future movements may hinge on ongoing central bank policy shifts related to inflation.
Market implications
Traders should monitor long-dated rates carefully, particularly as capital markets issuance escalates in the TMT sector, which will directly influence currency valuations. A critical level to watch for EUR/USD will be the 1.1700 target set for March 2026, which may prompt market volatility dependent on central bank communications.
Risks to this view
The primary risks to this call stem from unexpected changes in central bank monetary policies, particularly from the Fed and the ECB. A shift towards aggressive rate increases would likely alter expectations around long-dated yields, potentially leading to a reversal in trends.
Articles To what extent is the rise in long-dated rates attributable to AI? Published 12:30 Credit Rates TMT AI Share X LinkedIn E-mail Copy link Share X LinkedIn E-mail Copy link Download Probably 20% of the total influences. And of that, 70% reflects productivity and 25% is AI issuance.
It's a view based absolutely on what the numbers say, but in the end it's a judgement call (as objective as doable, overlaid with a large dollop of subjectivity) Padhraic Garvey, CFA , Jan Frederik Slijkerman and Timothy Rahill AI issuance pressure is having an impact on long-end rates, but so are inflation and fiscal deficits The spending piece has a small, but not an inconsequential impact There are three basic AI components to account for, namely: 1. The spending piece, 2. The capital markets piece, and 3.
The productivity piece. The spending piece is relatively straightforward, as it's a straight accounting in GDP. My colleague James Knightley has dealt with this in detail here .
Basically, AI accounts for a third of current economic growth. The link here with rates is the tendency for higher growth to be loosely associated with higher rates. However, given that the economy outside of AI is less dynamic, the AI piece is more of a filler than anything else.
The capital markets issuance piece has a more pursuasive impact The capital markets piece is more complex. ING's Jan Frederik Slijkerman did a deep dive into this space recently; it's here . For 2026, he identifies TMT as a meaningful driver of additional corporate issuance in the US, and something similar in Europe.
Jan Frederik goes on to argue that, while technology companies fund the bulk of their investments from operating cash flows, their rapidly increasing capital spending is weighing on corporate savings rates. As annual investment moves towards US$1 trillion, and a chunk of this is refinancing, the prognosis ahead is for issuance volumes to remain elevated. So what you see in 2026 should at least be repeated in 2027 and beyond.
My colleagues Timothy Rahill and Marine Leleux have crunched the latest corporate supply numbers for the US and Europe . They note that year-to-date USD corporate issuance has hit US$878bn, exceeding full-year corporate issuance recorded in every year from 2021 through to 2024, and running 54% above the same period last year. The increase is driven by TMT, tripling to US$330bn.
They also note that issuers have favoured the long end of the curve. Year-to-date issuance in maturities of 17 years and longer totals US$235bn, making it the largest maturity bucket, ahead of 9–12 year tenors (US$219bn). Equivalent issuance along the 10yr to 30yr part of the US Treasury curve sums to US$340bn.
That’s unchanged versus the previous year. If we factor in buybacks, they are running at some US$20bn above last year. So the swing factor from a US Treasuries perspective is an effective reduction in net issuance of the aforementioned US$20bn.
Contrast that with long-dated investment-grade corporate issuance, which is running up US$55bn compared with last year. Adding the two together, we have an overall 'delta' of some US$75bn (calculated as a US$55bn increase in corporate long-dated issuance versus a US$20bn increase in long-end Treasury buybacks for 2026). In other words, long-dated issuance pressure has been skewed towards corporates and away from US Treasuries.
We’d not consider this in any way destabilising. But it’s absolutely a factor to take into account. Long-dated corporate supply surges, led by TMT A US$75bn swing in relative long-end corporate issuance versus Treasuries Source: ING Research "> Source: ING Research It’s always difficult to put a basis point implication of this on long dates, but it’s tough to argue that this is not a contributing factor.
Even with less corporate issuance outside the AI space for 2026, aggregate corporate issuance is still well up, and with a longer duration tilt to boot. These AI-spend players have also chosen to issue bonds in place of bank borrowing in order to get the required size and duration. The bank avenue would have meant banks' funding is much shorter (traditional bank duration mismatch).
Bank lending is up, but nowhere near the same scale of the increase in bond issuance. So, either way, back ends are feeling more pressure than they would for long-dated funding. That all being said, the market has remained quite receptive to AI and wider corporate issuance.
New issue premiums have tended to be higher for longer duration / AI-related issuance, but in the 10bp area they are far from tipping the long end over the edge. The productivity piece pushes in the same direction, but more mythical in nature The productivity revolution that AI promises should enhance the productive capacity of both capital and labour. It's actually difficult to glean this from observed outcomes, but theoretically, productivity enhancement should correlate with upward pressure on real yields.
The theoretical chain here is from higher productivity to higher expected return on capital to higher investment spending financed through higher issuance, in turn commanding higher real rates. And in terms of the productivity of labour, it's difficult to argue that productivity is not significantly enhanced for knowledge-based activities and for customer support, and especially in coding generally. The dot.com boom, from the late 1990s into 2000, has echoes in the AI one that we see today.
The 10yr real yield was at 4% back then. And that 4% real yield coincided with a 10yr Treasury yield at comfortably over 6%. Arguably, the productivity story today is even more persuasive than it was back then.
The current 10yr real yield is 2.9%. And the 10yr nominal yield is at 5.2%. So we're still at least 100bp below the levels we saw back in 2000.
Whether we like it or not, rises in real yields for productivity reasons should be construed as higher yields for 'positive' reasons. A suggested breakout of influences from AI Here's a suggested breakdown of the pure AI impact. 1. About 5% from the spending piece 2.
About 25% from the issuance piece 3. About 70% from the productivity piece But we can't leave it here, as AI is not the only influencer for long-dated rates. In fact, we'd argue that two other drivers – inflation and fiscal deficits – have been more impactful.
It's far from all about the AI impact, as holistically we have inflation and fiscal deficit factors too It's tough to paint a picture of long rates without incorporating the classic influences of inflation and fiscal deficits. On the US fiscal deficit issue specifically, the emphasis is on the narrative and painting a picture of debt dynamics. Back in 2024, we did a US special on this.
See it here . ING's Carsten Brzeski, James Knightley and James Smith recently penned a wider update here . The fly in the ointment here is that US Treasury issuance is no higher this year than last, and the same can be said of the fiscal deficit in cash terms.
Instead, the market is concerned with the lack of US congressional ambition to undertake measures to improve the path for debt dynamics. Hence, the importance of the 'narrative' does not improve for the foreseeable future. The inflation profile is also key.
The pandemic shocked developed markets back into inflation generation capability, and the Iran war and energy price spikes have juiced things up again. At the same time, where we are now for the US long yields is no more than a return to slightly above normal, by about 50bp in the 10yr. See more here on what that is all about.
Ahead, we have inflation remaining sticky to the upside for 2026, before easing lower for 2027. What's driving higher long-end yields? Source: ING Research "> Source: ING Research The final breakout is as follows: 1.
Inflation profile = 50% 2. Fiscal deficit narrative = 30% 3. AI piece = 20% Contain inflation, and we go a long way to containing market rates.
Deficits mean supply, and that's an important ongoing influencer. And AI? Well, it's more the 'good' (productivity) than the 'bad' (issuance) that impacts.
And the ugly? Well, that's inflation. Even though break-even expectations have remained contained, printed inflation has not.
For the second quarter, the US GDP deflator (effectively inflation) was 4.4%, and nominal GDP rose by 6.6%. The current 10yr yield at 5.2% is not out of kilter with that. For more on the prognosis ahead, see here and here .
Supply Interest rates AI Content Disclaimer This publication has been prepared by ING solely for information purposes irrespective of a particular user's means, financial situation or investment objectives. The information does not constitute investment recommendation, and nor is it investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Read more Share X LinkedIn E-mail Copy link Share X LinkedIn E-mail Copy link Download Authors Padhraic Garvey, CFA Regional Head of Research, Americas Padhraic Garvey is the Regional Head of Research, Americas.
He's based in New York. His brief spans both developed and emerging markets and he specialises in global rates and macro relative… Jan Frederik Slijkerman Senior Sector Strategist, TMT Jan Frederik joined ING’s Credit Research team in 2021, covering Telecom, Media and Technology companies. He has been working in financial markets since 2006 as a Credit Analyst and Portfolio… Timothy Rahill Credit Strategist Timothy Rahill is a credit strategist at ING Bank in Amsterdam.
He joined the Bank straight out of University in 2019, after relocating to the Netherlands from Dublin. He graduated from Technical… In this article The spending piece has a small, but not an inconsequential impact The capital markets issuance piece has a more pursuasive impact The productivity piece pushes in the same direction, but more mythical in nature A suggested breakout of influences from AI It's far from all about the AI impact, as holistically we have inflation and fiscal deficit factors too
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